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Commercia Credit Corp. v. Nelson Motors, Ino.1 held that in
a suit on a guaranty by the guarantee, a defense that the guar-
antee, in the light of the attendant circumstances and the prior
dealings between the parties, had an implied obligation to
employ reasonable and normal diligence in collecting from the
principals, should not be stricken as sham and frivolous.
The suit was brought by the plaintiff financial institution in
an attempt to recover for an alleged breach of contract by the
defendant automobile merchant. Pursuant to earlier contracts
between the parties, the defendant had discounted to the plain-
tiff security instruments representing credit extended to car
buyers. In addition to the discount, the plaintiff withheld a
certain amount for each car covered by the instruments to serve
as a reserve fund to protect the plaintiff from loss due to for-
feiture or repossession.
After operating under this type of contract for a number of
years, the parties entered into an additional contract whereby
the plaintiff was to pay to the defendant all of the reserve
account over ten thousand dollars in consideration of the de-
fendant's promise to repurchase any cars repossessed by the
plaintiff under the security instruments. The parties agreed
that this contract made the defendant an absolute guarantor of
the obligations on the instruments.
In this action the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had
breached the contract by refusing to repurchase certain cars.
The defendant answered saying that it was under no duty to
repurchase because (1) Commercial had not paid over to the
defendant the amount of the reserves in excess of ten thousand
dollars, and (2) Commercial had not fulfilled its obligation to
use reasonable and normal diligence in collecting the balances
due on the automobiles. The defendant also counterclaimed for
the loss it alleged it sustained from the plaintiff's failure to
properly protect the accumulated reserve fund by reasonably
trying to collect the accounts.
The plaintiff moved to strike as sham and frivolous the coun-
terclaim and the defense dealing with the plaintiff's alleged
failure to use reasonable and normal diligence in collecting the
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accounts. The plaintiff's motion was specifically based on the
fact that the contract made no mention of such obligation on
the part of the plaintiff and generally, on the rule that an
absolute guarantor is not discharged by lack of diligence on the
guarantee's part in attempting to collect.2 In granting the
plaintiff's motion to strike, the circuit court indicated that the
parol evidence rule prevented any construction of the contract.
Thus the contract must have been considered as one of absolute
rather than conditional guaranty.
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the ruling of
the circuit court, and in so doing held that the law can imply
a term of reasonably and normal diligence in collecting. In
support of its decision the court quoted several authorities of
which the following is representative:
A contract includes not only what is expressly stated but
also what is necessarily to be implied from the language
used and external facts, such as the surrounding circum-
stances; and terms which may clearly be implied from a
consideration of the entire contract are as much a part
thereof as though plainly written on its face.
In the absence of an express provision therefor, the law
will imply an agreement by the parties to a contract to do
and perform those things that according to reason and
justice they should do in order to carry out the purpose for
which the contract was made.3
In deciding that the defense and counterclaim in this particu-
lar case were not sham and frivolous and that it was at least
"fairly arguable that Commercial was impliedly obligated to
pursue the collection of the accounts with reasonable and cus-
tomary diligence," 4 the court was perhaps primarily impressed
by the facts that the parties had dealt with each other over
quite a long period of time and that the long-term experience
of the defendant had been that the plaintiff regularly made
diligent efforts to collect accounts.
2. Providence Mach. Co. v. Browning, 68 S.C. 1, 46 S.E. 550 (1903); 38
C.J.S. Guaranty § 61 (1943). "The guaranty of the defendants herein being
absolute, it is well settled by the authorities of this State . . . that they are
liable to suit without first suing the principal debtor." Georgian Co. v. Brit-
ton, 141 S.C. 136, 141 S.E. 217, 218 (1927) (dictum).
3. 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 328 (1963).
4. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Nelson Motors, Inc., 247 S.C. 360, 369, 147
S.E.2d 481, 485 (1966).
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South Carolina has long recognized the prerogative of the
court to find contract terms by implication5 and to admit parol
evidence for this purpose." This case does, however, represent
an extension of the application of this rule to the guaranty fact
situation.
II. SPECMO PERFORMANCE OF AN ORAL CONTRACT TO DEVISE
In Footman v. Sweat 7 The South Carolina Supreme Court
followed prior cases8 in holding that (1) proof of the existence
of the contract in an action for specific performance of an oral
contract to devise "must be definite, clear, certain and con-
vincing";9 and (2) the Statute of Frauds' 9 is not a bar to spe-
cific performance of an oral contract to devise real estate when,
as here, the party contracting with the testatrix has performed
his part of the agreement. In this case the contracting party
had cared for the testatrix until her death."
III. ACoTIoN BASED ON FRAmD AND MISEPRESENTATION
In Wiglard v. Ckrysler Corp.12 the South Carolina Supreme
Court continued acceptance of the well-established rule that
although generally one cannot predicate a fraud action on un-
fulfilled promises or statements as to future events, an exception
is recognized in the case of a promise made without the inten-
tion of performance.13 In this case the court said that the plain-
tiff, a purchaser of a Chrysler automobile, had stated such a
cause of action for fraud against the defendant manufacturer
by alleging, along with his loss, (1) that because of statistical
data in its possession tending to indicate defective design of
the particular component involved, Chrysler had entered into
5. E.g., Soulios v. Mills Novelty Co., 198 S.C. 355, 17 S.E.2d 869 (1941);
Chatfield-Woods Co. v. Harley, 124 S.C. 280, 117 S.E. 539 (1923); Buist Co.
v. Lancaster Mercantile Co., 68 S.C. 523, 47 S.E. 978 (1904).
6. Ibid.
7. 247 S.C. 172, 146 S.E.2d 624 (1966).
8. McLauchlin v. Gressette, 224 S.C. 296, 79 S.E2d 149 (1953); Kerr v.
Kennedy, 105 S.C. 496, 90 S.E. 177 (1916).
9. 247 S.C. 172, 177, 146 S.E.2d 624, 627 (1966).
10. S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-101 (1962).
11. See Survey of Wills and Trusts in this issue for discussion of the will
in this case.
12. 248 S.C. 42, 148 S.E.2d 867 (1966).





Published by Scholar Commons, 1967
CONTRAoTS SURVEYED
a warranty with knowledge of the particular latent defect in its
product; and (2) that Chrysler "entered into the warranty pro-
viding that any obligation thereunder 'shall be performed by
any Chrysler Motors Corporation Authorized Dealer,' when it
knew that the defect was such as could not be remedied by the
dealer."'
4
In Robert E. Lee & Co. v. Commission of Pub. Tlorks,15 the
South Carolina Supreme Court held that a contractor for a
public construction project had a right to rely on positive rep-
resentations made by the defendant Commission as to subsoil
conditions despite the clauses in the contract disclaiming liabil-
ity for inaccurate information. The plaintiff contractor, suc-
cessful bidder on a pipe-line construction project, sought dam-
ages for increased construction costs which he claimed resulted
from the defendant's failure to reveal fully the subsoil condi-
tion and water levels existing along the pipeline route.
Prior to the acceptance of bids on the project, the defendant
Commission made test-hole borings along the proposed route and
obtained information therefrom as to subsoil classification and
location of ground water. The plaintiff asserted, and the de-
fendant admitted, that the information so obtained differed
from the information given on the plans which the defendant
submitted to the plaintiff for bidding purposes. The defendant
contended, however, that the following "special condition" of
the contract barred the plaintiff's claim:
The Owner has made auger borings along the pipe line
route to determine the character of the subsurface materials.
The location and logs of these test holes are shown on the
plans. While all test holes were sunk with reasonable care
and in accordance with good practice, it is-to be understood
that there is no expressed or implied guarantee as to the
accuracy of the information given nor of the interpretation
thereof. Each bidder must form his own opinion of the
character of the materials to be excavated, or which will be
encountered, from an inspection of the ground, place his
own interpretation upon the information given on the test
hole logs, and make such other investigations as he may
desire.'0
14. 248 S.C. 42, 47, 148 S.E2d 867, 869 (1966).
15. 248 S.C. 84, 149 S.E2d 55 (1966).
16. Id. at 88-89, 149 S.E.2d at 57.
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The defendant also relied on the statement required of each
bidder affirming his examination of the plans, specifications,
conditions and to location of the proposed pipe line and that he
was acquainted with and fully understood "the nature and
extent of the excavations to be made and the general character
and condition of the materials to be removed therefrom .... -17
The South Carolina Supreme Court decided that the Com-
mission's statement that it had made test-hole borings and that
the findings of such borings were shown on the plans, amounted
to a representation that the information revealed by the borings
was thereby accurately and fully disclosed. The court further
said that "the contractor was entitled to rely upon that repre-
sentation; and the owner's responsibility under it was not over-
come by the disclaimer clauses ... ""I
In finding for the contractor, the court relied heavily on the
case of Hollerbach v. United States:
If the government wished to leave the matter open to the
independent investigation of the claimants, it might easily
have omitted the specification as to the character of the
filling back of the dam. In its positive assertion of the
nature of this much of the work it made a representation
upon which the claimants had a right to rely without an
investigation to prove its falsity.' 9
Although apparently there are no South Carolina cases in
point, the decision in Robert E. Lee c6 Co. appears to be in line
with the general law on the subject:
The general rule may be deduced from the decisions that
where plans or specifications lead a public contractor rea-
sonably to believe that conditions indicated therein exist,
and may be relied upon in making his bid, he will be
entitled to compensation for extra work or expense made
necessary by conditions being other than as so represented
.... The rule just stated is especially applicable where the
representation as to conditions is positive, in which case the
right of the contractor is not affected by general language
of the contract to the effect that he is expected to investi-
gate facts for himself.
20
17. Id. at 90, 149 S.E.2d at 58.
18. Id. at 90, 149 S.E.2d at 58.
19. 233 U.S. 165, 172 (1914).
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IV. LEGISLATION
A misdemeanor is created by Act No. 981,21 recently enacted
in this State, for knowingly using dual contracts22 for the
purpose of sale or purchase of real property.
ROBERT L. WYNN, III
21. S.C. Acts & J. Res. 1966, p. 2284.
22. Dual contracts are defined in the act as "two contracts concerning the
same parcel of real property, one of which states the true and actual purchase
price and one of which states a purchase price in excess of the true and actual
purchase price and is used as an inducement for mortgage investors to make
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